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Abstract: 
Canada played a crucial role in the birth of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, 
endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, and can remain proud of its achievement 
in generating a new international consensus about how to respond to genocide and other 
mass atrocity crimes. Good progress has been made against the four relevant benchmarks 
– R2P’s role as a normative force, institutional catalyst, effective preventive framework 
and effective reactive framework. Despite the breakdown of Security Council consensus 
over Libya in 2011, and the failure since then of R2P to stop mass atrocity crimes in 
Syria, there are grounds for optimism about its more effective implementation in the 
future. 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P):  
The ICISS Commission Fifteen Years On  
 
If it was not for Canada we would not have the Responsibility to Protect, the 
internationally agreed principle unanimously embraced by the world’s heads of state and 
government in the 2005 World Summit and endorsed by the UN General Assembly, that those at 
risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are not nobody’s 
business but the whole world’s business – a matter of international peace and security concern – 
even when such crimes are committed wholly within the boundaries of a single sovereign state. 
It was Canada, nobody else, who after a decade of total paralysis by the international 
community in response to a series of terrible mass atrocity crimes through the 1990s, responded 
to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s despairing and heartfelt plea to the General Assembly in 
2000: “If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” 
The then foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy – as you will all know, a fiercely principled 
Pearsonian liberal, a national tradition I’m delighted to see is now back in place in Ottawa after 
ten years of exile – decided to meet Annan’s challenge by establishing a blue ribbon 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to wrestle with the 
whole range of legal, moral, operational and political questions rolled up in the intervention 
debate, to consult with the widest possible range of opinion around the world, and to bring back 
a report that would help the Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common 
ground.  
When Lloyd – who had known me as a like-minded foreign minister – invited me to co-
chair his proposed commission, I didn’t need much persuasion. And he gave me a cast made in 
heaven to work with. My co-chair, Mohamed Sahnoun, a distinguished Algerian diplomat and 
veteran UN Africa adviser had a delightful capacity to defuse likely tensions, usually with 
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African parables involving lions, monkeys, crocodiles, scorpions, or all of the above – and an 
appropriate leavening influence on his sometimes overly exuberant antipodean colleague. Also 
from the global South there was former President Fidel V. Ramos, the avuncular, cigar-chewing, 
hero of the Filipino People Power revolution; African National Congress head Cyril Ramaphosa 
from South Africa, Guatemalan Foreign Minister and later Vice-President Eduardo Stein; and the 
multi-talented and much-travelled Indian scholar and UN official, Ramesh Thakur (who has 
spent a good part of his life teaching in Canada).  
From the North there were former US Congressman Lee Hamilton, German NATO 
General Klaus Naumann, and two Canadians: legal specialist Gisele Cote-Harper, and then 
Harvard-based human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff.1 Making up the balance of the 
commission members were the Russian diplomat and parliamentarian Vladimir Lukin, and 
Cornelio Sommaruga the Swiss diplomat and former long-serving president of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, who rather liked my description of him as “a Northerner with 
Southern characteristics”. We also had an outstanding support staff, led by Jill Sinclair, a hugely 
capable and imaginative diplomat (and nowadays senior Defence official) who was wonderfully 
refreshing to work with, not least, perhaps, because she sidelined as a nightclub jazz singer, with 
a personal style owing more allegiance to Haight-Ashbury than the Champs Elysee.  
So ICISS was launched in September 2000, and just over a year later, in December 2001 
– after five commission meetings, eleven regional roundtables and national consultations across 
five continents – The Responsibility to Protect was born, with the publication, under that title, of 
our 90-page report and 400-page supplementary volume of research essays, bibliography and 
background material.2 Somewhat miraculously, the final ICISS report had in it not a single line 
of recorded dissent. But along the way just about everything was contestable – and contested.  
The name of the report and its sustaining theme was no exception to the contestability 
rule. At the first of the commission’s five meetings, in Ottawa in November 2000, I suggested in 
                                                          
1 Ignatieff was to personally experience in his later career, as you will recall, what I told him at the time: 
that politics, even in a country as gentle and polite as Canada, was a bloody and dangerous trade, and best 
avoided by normally sane and sensitive souls. 
2 See https://web.archive.org/web/20070731161527/http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/report2-en.asp.  
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my opening remarks that what we needed was a strong new phrase, one that would capture the 
flavour of what we all wanted to say about the moral imperative of responding to mass atrocity 
crimes, be succinct and memorable, and, while having some continuity with the debate of which 
we had all been part over the past decade, would also mark an escape from its sterility and 
divisiveness. So far, so good. But then, having spent a few mornings under the shower in the 
lead-up to our meeting toying with a score or more of different word combinations, I was 
adventurous enough to suggest that maybe, just maybe, there was such a phrase we could agree 
met these specifications, and which could even work as the title of our report – “the 
responsibility to protect”. This was met by what I can only describe as a collective, incredulous 
intake of breath: “Well, we’ll have to think long and hard about that” was the hardly 
unreasonable general response. To suggest the report’s title before we had even begun to discuss 
its content, let alone taken any soundings in the dozen consultations that were scheduled to take 
place around the world, was considered a little presumptuous, even for an Australian. 
The achievement of the ICISS report was to fundamentally change the course of the 
debate, a rather unusual impact for any such commission report to have. Its key contributions 
were fourfold. First, changing the language of the debate, as just described, from the “the right to 
intervene” to “the responsibility to protect”, making it possible for entrenched opponents to find 
new ground on which to more constructively engage. Second, broadening the range of actors in 
the frame so as to include not just international actors able and willing to apply military force, 
but the whole international community. Third, broadening dramatically the range of responses: 
whereas humanitarian intervention focused one-dimensionally on military reaction, R2P involves 
multiple elements in the response continuum – preventive action, both long and short term; 
reaction when prevention fails, with reaction itself a nuanced continuum from persuasion all the 
way up to coercive military force; and, finally, post-crisis rebuilding aimed again at prevention, 
this time of recurrence of the harm in question. Fourth, recognising that however much one 
might strive to avoid resorting to military coercion that might still be in some cases the only 
credible option, identifying very clear (and hard to satisfy in all but the most extreme cases) 
criteria for the use of force.  
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The process by which the 2001 ICISS report became a unanimous 2005 UN General 
Assembly resolution is another long story which I will skip over here, except to say that Canada 
again played a centrally important role (along with, in particular, South Africa and a number of 
other sub-Saharan states whose active support was absolutely crucial). In the final stages of the 
World Summit debate a handful of resistant countries, above all India, looked like killing the 
necessary consensus – until some very effective personal diplomacy from then Prime Minister 
Paul Martin at the last minute brought them aboard.  
In the form in which it was embraced by the World Summit and adopted by the General 
Assembly, the resolution identified three separate dimensions to the responsibility involved: the 
responsibility of a state to its own people not to either commit such mass atrocity crimes or allow 
them to occur (now referred to as Pillar One); the responsibility of other states to assist those 
lacking the capacity to so protect (Pillar Two); and the responsibility of the international 
community to respond with “timely and decisive action” (including ultimately with coercive 
military force if that is authorised by the Security Council) if a state is “manifestly failing” to 
meet its protection responsibilities (Pillar Three). 
It is important to make clear that, as we in the commission conceived it and the UN 
member states eventually adopted it after four years of protracted diplomatic wrangling, R2P 
really was designed for pragmatists rather than purists. Its intended contribution was not to 
international relations theory but political practice. It was designed not to create new legal rules 
but rather a compelling new sense of moral and political obligation to apply existing ones. It was 
to generate a reflex international response that genocide, other crimes against humanity, and 
major war crimes happening behind sovereign state walls were not nobody’s business: that 
sovereignty could never be a license to kill. The bottom line was always to change behaviour: to 
ensure that global policymakers would never again have to look back, in the aftermath of yet 
another genocidal catastrophe like Cambodia or Rwanda or Srebrenica, and ask themselves – 
with a mixture of anger, incomprehension and shame – how they could possibly have let it all 
happen again. 
So, looking back over the fifteen years since the ICISS report appeared, how well did we 
succeed in this very ambitious aspiration? Looking at the present catastrophe in Syria, where 
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R2P gained no traction at all, and the horrible aftermath of the initially successful R2P-based 
military intervention in Libya, it would be easy to be cynical – as many critics are – and say that 
the whole enterprise has been a complete waste of time, or worse. But let me give you a more 
positive stocktake, using as my benchmarks the four big things that R2P was designed to be: a 
normative force; a catalyst for institutional change; a framework for preventive action; and a 
framework for effective reactive action when prevention has failed.  
R2P as a Normative Force 
It may be a stretch – but I’ll take it – to say, as the British historian Martin Gilbert did 
two years after the 2005 World Summit, that acceptance of the responsibility to protect is “the 
most significant adjustment to sovereignty in 360 years”. But it is certainly true to say that there 
has been continuing growth in acceptance of R2P as a principle, or normative standard, in a way 
that would have been unimaginable for the earlier concept of “humanitarian intervention” which 
R2P has now almost completely, and rightly, displaced. Although many states are still clearly 
more comfortable with the first two pillars of R2P than they are with the third, and there will 
always be argument about what precise form action should take in a particular case, there is no 
longer any serious dissent evident in relation to any of the elements of the 2005 Resolution.  
On the basic issue of principle, a genuine – and unprecedented – global consensus has 
emerged over the last ten years that state sovereignty is not a license to kill, that mass atrocity 
crimes – even those committed entirely within a state’s borders – are the world’s business. The 
best evidence lies in the General Assembly’s annual interactive debates since 2009, which have 
shown ever stronger and more clearly articulated support for the new norm, and in the more than 
50 resolutions referencing R2P that have now been passed by the Security Council (more than 40 
of them after the divisions over Libya in 2011). 
R2P as an Institutional Catalyst 
All the normative consolidation in the world will not be of much use if R2P is not 
capable of delivering protection in practice. That means for a start the continued evolution of 
institutional preparedness, at the national, regional and global level, particularly at the crucial 
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stages of early prevention, and early reaction to warning signs of impending catastrophe. R2P 
has been a change agent here, with civilian response capability receiving much more organized 
attention. The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program announced earlier this year by the 
new Canadian government, although it has a wider remit than purely R2P situations, is an 
excellent example of the thinking now going into coordinating more effective responses by 
multiple agencies to complex political crises abroad. Militaries are also rethinking their force 
configuration, doctrine, rules of engagement, and training to deal better with mass atrocity 
response operations, which often need to fall somewhere between peacekeeping and full-scale 
war fighting.  
Of great importance has been the move to establish “focal points” – designated high-level 
officials whose job is to analyse atrocity risk and mobilise appropriate responses. There are now 
more than 50 members of the “Global Network of R2P Focal Points” convened by the Global 
Centre which I chair, still not including Canada I’m sorry to say but I hope that will soon be 
corrected by the new government. But here as elsewhere more needs to be done – not least at UN 
Headquarters, where the roles of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and, 
unhappily still only part-time, Special Adviser on R2P, need to be not only recognized, but 
rationalised, coordinated and strengthened. 
R2P as a Preventive Framework 
The credibility of the whole R2P enterprise has depended from the outset on giving 
central importance to prevention. And here, especially in the context of post-crisis prevention of 
recurrence, R2P-driven strategies have had a number of successes, notably in Kenya after 2008, 
the West African cases of Sierra Leone after 2002, Liberia after 2003, Guinea and Kyrgyzstan 
after 2010, and Cote d’Ivoire after 2011. Most peacekeeping operations now have protection of 
civilians mandates – built on R2P’s sister concept of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(POC3) – and most of the time those operations are succeeding in keeping the lids on some often 
very simmering pots.  
                                                          
3 See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml.  
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On the other hand, while there is now a very good understanding of the large toolbox of 
preventive measures available at all stages of the conflict cycle, and a very long tradition of 
regular lip-service being paid to the need for effective prevention, the record of practical delivery 
is not nearly as strong as it should be. Part of the problem of getting sufficient resources to 
engage in successful prevention is the age-old one that success here means that nothing visible 
actually happens: no-one gets the kind of credit that is always on offer for effective fire-fighting 
after the event. It is the responsibility of all of us to continue working to change that culture. 
R2P as a Reactive Framework 
This is where the rubber hits the road. What do we do if a state, through incapacity or ill-
will, has failed to meet its Pillar One responsibilities? What do we do if prevention has 
manifestly failed, and mass atrocity crimes are actually occurring or imminently about to occur? 
The not-so-good news is that on the critical challenge of stopping mass atrocity crimes that are 
under way, whether through diplomatic persuasion, stronger measures like sanctions or criminal 
prosecutions, or through military intervention, and acting under either pillar two or pillar three, 
R2P’s record has been mixed, at best.  
There have been some success stories: Kenya in 2008, Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and – at 
least initially – Libya in 2011. And some partial success can be claimed for the new or 
revitalized UN peacekeeping operations in Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African 
Republic. But there have also been some serious failures, certainly including Sri Lanka in 2009. 
In Sudan, where the original crisis in Darfur predates R2P but the situation continues to 
deteriorate, President Omar al-Bashir remains effectively untouched either by his International 
Criminal Court indictment or multiple Security Council resolutions. We are not doing as well as 
we should be in stopping non-state actors like Boko Haram committing atrocity crimes in 
territory over which they have control. And, above all, there has been catastrophic international 
paralysis over Syria. 
The crucial lapse in Syria occurred in mid-2011, when the Assad regime’s violence was 
one-sided and containable. Driven by the perception, not itself unreasonable, that the Western 
powers had overreached in Libya by stretching a limited mandate to protect civilians into a 
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regime-change crusade, a number of Security Council members then overreached in the other 
direction: seeing another slippery slope in Syria, the majority gave no support for a resolution 
even just to condemn the regime’s violence against unarmed civilians. And with the Syrian 
leadership sensing its impunity, the situation deteriorated quickly into the full-scale civil war 
raging today. 
There is no more important or urgent task for R2P advocates than to rebuild consensus 
within the Security Council as to the right way to handle the hardest of cases, when it may well 
be that the threat or use of coercive military force is the only way of stopping catastrophic 
atrocity crimes in their tracks. Re-establishing that consensus is not impossible, but it will take 
time. The “responsibility while protecting” (RWP) proposal put on the table by Brazil in 2011 
remains the most constructive of all the suggested ways forward, requiring as it would all 
Council members to accept close monitoring and review of any coercive military mandate 
throughout such a mandate’s lifetime, and I think it reasonable to hope that some agreement 
along these lines will eventually be reached.  
There are a number of other ways in which Security Council practice could be modified 
to enhance its responsibility when handling atrocity crime cases, which I also hope will be taken 
seriously by Council members. They include embracing the Accountability, Coherence and 
Transparency (ACT) Group’s Code of Conduct4 and the veto restraint initiatives tabled by 
France and Mexico, both of which are receiving increasing support from the wider UN 
membership.  
Complete, fully effective implementation of R2P remains some way off. But I see no 
evidence anywhere that anyone wants a return to the bad old days, when the whole UN was a 
consensus free zone on mass atrocity crime issues. We should never forget how bad those days 
could be. In November 1975, seven months after the Khmer Rouge had commenced its genocidal 
slaughter, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously said to Thailand’s foreign minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan: “You should also tell the Cambodians [the Khmer Rouge] that we will 
be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in our way.” 
                                                          
4 See http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/888.  
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As cynical as our political leaders sometimes remain – and as a long-time politician 
myself, I know a fair bit about that culture – it’s hard to imagine any of them today feeling able 
to talk like that. That’s a measure of how far we have come with R2P. And if that’s true, it’s a 
great tribute to a great Canadian initiative. 
